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Many prominent lines of research on student's reasoning and conceptual change within learning 
sciences and physics education research have not attended to the role of learners' affect or emotions in the 
dynamics of their conceptual reasoning. This is despite evidence from psychology and cognitive- and 
neuro- sciences that emotions are deeply integrated with cognition and documented associations in 
education research between emotions and academic performance. The few studies that have aimed to 
integrate emotions within models of learners’ cognition, have mostly done so at a coarse grain size. In this 
manuscript, toward the long-term goal of incorporating emotions into fine-grained models of in-the-
moment cognitive dynamics, we present a case study of Judy, an undergraduate electrical engineering and 
physics major. We argue that a fine-grained aspect of Judy’s affect, her annoyance at a particular kind of 
homework problem, stabilizes a context-dependent epistemological stance she displays, about an 
unbridgeable gulf she perceives to exist between real and ideal circuits. 
 
PACS: 01.40.-d, 01.40.J-, 01.40.gb 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A. Research on learner’s conceptual 
development does not attend to the role of 
learners’ emotions in learning 
As instructors, educators, and education 
researchers, intuitively we know that students’ 
emotions, motivations, and sense of identity can 
strongly influence their behaviors in science 
learning environments. Research in cognitive 
science makes a persuasive case for the role that 
affect plays in regulating performance on 
cognitive tasks  [1–7]. Nonetheless, explicitly 
incorporating emotion into theories of science 
learning, though recognized as important, has 
proved to be a challenge  [8–11].  
Cognitivist accounts of student 
reasoning and conceptual change in science 
have primarily focused on the form and content 
of novices’ knowledge, but haven’t attended to 
learners’ emotions  [12–17]. Within research on 
physics learning also, the focus has mostly been 
on the content of students’ ideas  [18–24]. Two 
resource papers on physics education research, 
assembling important research in the field list 
research on students’ ideas in content areas such 
as mechanics or thermodynamics, or on 
practices such as problem-solving  [25,26]. 
Research on physics learners affect and 
emotions has not garnered enough attention yet 
to deserve a category mention within these two 
collections of resources on physics education 
research and the papers in other categories don’t 
have a meaningful or deep treatment of the 
relation between affect/emotion and learning.  
More recently, research has expanded 
beyond a focus on students’ conceptual 
knowledge to include attention to students’ 
“personal epistemologies,” individuals’ beliefs 
towards knowledge and learning in the 
discipline  [27]. Within physics education, this 
has been motivated by the desire to cultivate 
sophisticated attitudes towards science  [28–31], 
as well as by the evidence that students’ 
personal epistemologies influence what 
conceptual knowledge they draw on when 
learning and doing physics  [32–39]. The latter 
thread conceptualizes personal epistemologies 
in terms of fine-grained cognitive resources that 
codify information about knowledge, knowing, 
and learning, such as knowledge as transmitted 
stuff  as a resource for understanding the source 
of knowledge as propagated from a source to a 
recipient, and facts as a resource for 
understanding the form of knowledge as 
separable bits of information  [40,41]. These 
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elements contextually activate in different 
combinations to constitute an individual’s 
stance towards the nature and form of 
knowledge they are engaging with in a given 
moment. Over time, repeated activation of 
particular combinations could potentially lead to 
coherent ‘belief-like’ entities  [41,42]. However, 
this line of research on physics learners’ 
epistemologies also does not include emotions 
within it’s purview (with one exception  [33] 
that we will discuss below). 
There has, however, been some progress 
in understanding that learners’ emotions 
contribute to the learning processes. While there 
are many threads in this literature, in this brief 
review we focus on the research that aims to 
establish that learners’ conceptual and 
epistemological development is tied to their 
emotions. Given our goal of moving toward 
affect-inclusive cognitive models, we do not 
review the research that explores constructs 
such as “interest,” “motivation,” or that focuses 
on learners’ emotions without a simultaneous 
attention to learners’ conceptions or 
epistemologies. 
B. Research suggests that learners conceptual 
and epistemological reasoning might be tied 
with their affect 
Even early on, a few researchers did 
allude to the notion that learning is affective. 
The notion of cognitive dissonance, for 
example, is acknowledged to have an affective 
dimension  [43–45].  In a now classic 
manuscript, Pintrich, Marx, Boyle  [9] argued 
for greater attention to “hot” cognition: models 
of cognition and learning that attend to the 
conceptual as well as the affective domains. The 
Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge 
Model  [46,47] and the Cognitive-Affective 
Model of Conceptual Change  [48] are two 
examples of models that aim to integrate 
learners’ motivations and interests in models of 
conceptual change. The Cognitive-Affective 
Model of Conceptual Change also allows for 
emotions other than motivation, such as anxiety, 
the feeling of threat, etc. to play a role in the 
dynamics of conceptual change, though research 
needs to explore further how these aspects play 
out in the moment.  On the empirical side, there 
is evidence that different emotions might have 
varying levels and quality of influence on 
learning. Pekrun et al.  [49], for example, 
document that higher academic achievement is 
positively correlated with academic joy and 
excitement; and negatively with affective states 
such as boredom. In a similar vein, the affective 
states of flow and curiosity have been shown to 
be correlated with greater learning 
gains  [50,51].  
Some research has attended to the 
intertwining of epistemological beliefs and 
affect, though much of this research has been 
carried out in the context of mathematics 
education  [8,52–57]. Boaler and Greeno  [52] 
found that in a traditional, authoritarian 
classroom environment a student can develop 
perceptions of mathematics as an un-creative 
subject. For some students, this clashes with 
their personal value toward understanding an 
idea via exploring multiple interpretations, with 
the epistemological mismatch producing 
negative affect toward the subject itself.  Op’t 
Eynde et al.  [55] take a socio-constructivist 
approach to emotions arguing that learners’ 
emotions during problem solving are 
intertwined with their interpretations and 
appraisals of the unfolding activity, and these in 
turn are intertwined with their epistemological 
and self-efficacy beliefs.  Cobb et al.  [53] have 
argued that the formation of socio-mathematical 
norms in the mathematics classroom (some of 
which have epistemological aspects – norms 
about what counts as knowing and doing 
mathematics) are often influenced by the 
teachers’ and students’ emotions. Within 
physics education research, we could only find 
one article that explicitly argues for the 
association of students’ personal epistemologies 
and their emotions: Bodin and Winberg  [33] 
found that students’ performance on a classical 
mechanics assignment was associated with 
expert-like beliefs (such as sense-making) and 
emotions associated with control and 
concentration, with the beliefs and emotions 
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being measured through self-reports on survey 
instruments. 
C. Our goal is to shed light on how affect 
influences learning through building models 
that couple conceptions, epistemologies, and 
emotions at fine-timescales 
Correlational studies  [33,49,50] are 
significant in that they furnish empirical 
evidence that emotions influence learning, but 
they do not provide causal mechanisms through 
which the observed correlations arise. Models of 
affective conceptual change aim to incorporate 
affect, but are limited by their (1) attention to 
motivation and interest, (ii) conceptualization of 
novice knowledge as stable organized structures 
that transform via learning. Recent empirical 
evidence, however, points to a view of novice 
knowledge as more dynamic, unstable, and 
contextual  [34,36,38,58–62].  Researchers have 
argued for a similar dynamic, contextual view of 
students’ personal epistemology  [41] as well as 
for emotions  [55,63]. Given this view of 
knowledge, beliefs, and emotions as dynamic at 
fine timescales and the emerging evidence that 
the emotional and cognitive domains are 
interconnected  [2,3,5,64,65], it seems 
reasonable to ask: What is the role of students’ 
emotional stances in the dynamics of their 
conceptual and epistemological reasoning on a 
moment-to-moment basis?  
 
In this paper, we use a case study of an 
undergraduate engineering major, “Judy,” to 
argue for the feasibility and explanatory power 
of integrating conceptual, epistemological, and 
affective elements at fine grain sizes and fine 
time scales. Our analysis shows that in some 
contexts, Judy, an electrical engineering and a 
physics major taking a Basic Circuits course, 
argues that there is a wide gulf between real 
circuits and idealized circuit models taught in 
the course, a gulf that renders qualitative 
understanding of ideal circuits practically 
useless to her. We will argue that an affective 
stance—Judy’s deep annoyance at qualitative, 
conceptual homework problems—stabilizes her 
epistemological stance. Our analysis aims to 
show how disrupting the affective stance co-
occurs with the reversal of the epistemological 
stance – at least briefly. 
This argument has instructional 
implications. If a learners’ emotional stance 
plays a significant role in sustaining their 
epistemological stance, as we argue is the case 
with Judy, then interventions targeting the 
learners’ epistemologies or conceptions directly 
(for e.g. the intervention described by 
Rosenberg, Hammer, and Phelan  [38] need not 
be the only or the productive instructional 
pathway.  
In the following section, we present the 
methods of our case study. We then present the 
patterns we found in Judy’s epistemological and 
emotional stances. Finally, we make the case 
that a fine-grained account of Judy’s reasoning 
is empirically inadequate if it does not include 
the affective elements that lend stability to her 
epistemological stances. The argument relies on 
competing toy models of Judy’s cognitive 
dynamics, one of which includes affect and the 
other of which does not. 
II. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
We videotaped clinical interviews of 
electrical engineering majors in a basic circuits 
course at a large public university. The course 
homework and exams mixed “traditional” 
quantitative problems with conceptual questions 
asking students to interpret equations and/or 
explain physical processes (rather than plugging 
and chugging). These conceptual problems were 
co-created by the course instructor and two of 
the authors (AG, AE). One of us (BD) 
conducted one-hour semi-structured interviews 
with Judy and with 3 other students to explore 
their approaches to mathematics within, and 
their views and feelings about, the course. 
Interview participants were paid ten dollars.  
First, we started with one of us (BD) 
viewing the videotapes from the interviews and 
in real time generating content logs of the 
interview – brief summaries of the conversation 
and activities in each 3-5 minute segment. 
Given our research interest in students’ 
approaches to learning and problem-solving 
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within the course, a few things were specially 
attended to and flagged at this stage: (i) explicit 
epistemological statements made by students, 
(ii) explicit details on their experience in the 
course, especially if it pertained to the use of 
mathematics, (iii) meta-conversational features 
such as large gestures, or explicit facial 
expressions.  
Then we looked at the interview 
videotapes together as a group. Here mostly the 
tape is run in real time. And anyone is welcome 
to stop the tape if they notice anything that they 
want to flag or talk about  [66–68]. Working as 
a group, we looked for epistemological and 
affective patterns in participants’ responses, 
both within and across subjects. While not 
engaging in systematic interaction 
analysis  [69], we informally borrow tools from 
discourse analysis  [70], framing analysis  [71], 
and affective analysis  [54,55] to interpret 
gestures, facial expressions, word choice, and 
the contextualized substance of participants’ 
utterances in the interviews.  
In this paper, we present our analysis of 
one of our participants, Judy – a second year 
Electrical Engineering and Physics major. 
Watching the interview with Judy, very early in 
the process, what jumped out at us was (i) her 
emotional reactions when she talks about the 
conceptual questions in her Basic Circuits 
homework and (ii) a strong sense of rift she 
perceived between qualitative understanding of 
ideal circuits and working with real circuits. We 
formed explanations for her reasoning and 
behaviors and then looked for evidence 
elsewhere in the data to confirm or disconfirm 
the validity of these patterns  [72,73]. Working 
from a knowledge-in-pieces 
perspective  [15,74], we did not expect global 
coherence in all aspects of her thinking; we 
continually considered how specific contextual 
cues might trigger different “local coherences” 
in her thinking  [15,35,38]. Drawing from 
notions of “society of mind”  [75] and 
knowledge-in-pieces  [15] we model Judy’s 
reasoning in the interview in terms of dynamic 
activation of epistemological  [38,41] and 
affective “pieces.” 
 
III. DATA AND FINDINGS: NOTICING 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND AFFECTIVE PATTERNS 
IN JUDY’S TALK ABOUT CIRCUITS 
In this section we chronologically 
present segments of the interview that illustrate 
that (i) Judy thinks that there is a wide gulf 
between real circuits and idealized circuit 
models, (ii) that conceptual reasoning about 
idealized circuits is unproductive and useless 
and (iii) Judy is has a strong negative affective 
reaction (annoyance) towards the conceptual 
reasoning about circuits. 
The interview starts with Brian asking 
Judy about the course. Judy states that the 
course is challenging since this is her first 
Electrical Engineering course while other 
students had taken a course or two before this. 
When asked, she says that she thinks that 
problem-solving is the most important aspect of 
the course. She acknowledges that she does not 
know what a professional electrical engineer 
does but believes that it must involve dealing 
with circuits. To delve further into her sense of 
what circuits knowledge a professional 
electrical engineering might need, Brian asks 
Judy to imagine a female professional engineer 
who is taking a basic circuits course to reinforce 
her understanding of circuits, in preparation for 
a new job assignment. Specifically, Brian asks 
what a perfect version of the Basic Circuits 
course would look like for that engineer: 
[05:16] Judy: Well, I think, 
um, the course should talk more 
about, um, how the actual world 
works. Because, sometimes we talk 
about, like, ideal circuits and, um 
(frowns) theoretical methods. Those 
are not related to the actual circuit 
and those kind of things. So if the 
professor can talk a little bit more 
about the actual circuit and how 
those work, then it may be better for 
her. (sighs and relaxes to a less alert 
posture) 
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[05:55] Brian: Why is that 
difference important to you? 
[05:57] Judy: Um, (smiles 
slightly) Because the ideal world is 
different. (slight laugh as she utters the 
last words) 
[06:02] Brian: Ok 
[06:13] Judy: Um, and, 
sometimes [in class] we talk about, 
um, the physical aspects of the 
circuits. Um, but I feel like when you 
really work on circuits it’s—it’s not 
very important. I mean, it’s better to 
know what happened physically, but 
if those are not ideal circuits, then it’s 
different. 
Here (and elsewhere), Judy expresses the 
view that the “real world” of circuits operates 
much differently from the “ideal circuits” she 
has learned about in class; the second is not a 
close approximation of the first. This 
disconnect, Judy posits, makes learning how 
actual circuits work more valuable for the 
hypothetical professional engineer.  
The real-ideal distinction holds personal 
importance for Judy. As Judy talks about “ideal 
circuits and theoretical methods” she frowns and 
her facial expression registers displeasure.  As 
Judy speaks about the lack of utility in 
understanding the “physical aspects of the 
circuits”, she frowns again and her face pulls to 
a side in an expression of mild disgust. It is 
difficult to place a label to her emotion, but not 
difficult to understand the negative valence of 
her affect in this moment. The emphasis in 
Judy’s speech as she utters “really work on 
circuits” underscores the difference she sees 
between working on circuits in real life and the 
problems and discussions that are a part of the 
basic circuits course. This real-ideal distinction, 
for her, is coupled to another pattern that comes 
up often in the interview: that learning about the 
idealized and/or physical models of circuits does 
not have practical use.  
 
[06:45] Brian: Hmm (pause) So 
do you think if you're analyzing a 
real-world circuit, it's still important 
to know about the physical aspects of 
the circuit? 
[06:55] Judy: Not very 
important 
[06:57] Brian: OK. What is 
important? 
[07:01] Judy: What is 
important? 
[07:02] Brian: Mmmhmm. 
Especially if you're dealing with a real 
world circuit. 
[07:06] Judy: Know exactly 
how the- what's the difference 
between a real world circuit and an 
ideal world circuit, and, yeah how to 
deal with the real one 
 
Brian tries to probe a bit deeper into this 
real-ideal gulf that Judy feels and the associated 
sense that conceptual reasoning about ideal 
circuits is not useful for analyzing real circuits.   
 
[08:00] Brian: When you 
started the course, did you have a 
sense of differences between ideal 
world circuits and real world circuits? 
[08:09] Judy: No, I know 
nothing about circuits. 
[08:12] Brian: OK.  
[08:17] Brian: So, for you as 
you've taken the course, has your 
sense of real-world and ideal world 
changed in any way since the 
beginning? 
[08:28] Judy: Yeah. Yes, I now 
feel like many components in the 
circuits are not perfect. It's not like 
you can completely use the physical 
method to analyze those. 
[08:46] Brian: OK 
[08:50] Brian: Could you say a 
little bit more about the physical 
method? 
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[08:53] Judy: Um, like a 
capacitor, I might say this wrong, but 
um, like they have a limit that how 
many currents, or how many 
electrons (moves left hand up and 
down in a chopping motion) can stay 
on the plate (chops both hands 
down). That's a real world (moves left 
hand up and down in a chopping 
motion) capacitor. But, for, ideally, 
sometimes in the course we assume 
that each plate (spreads hands apart) 
can have infinite amount of electrons 
(turns both hands palm up), and those 
kind of things. So, I mean, if that 
doesn't exist (turns left hand palm up) 
then why do we use that method to 
solve it? We are not gonna use that 
method in the future anyway. I mean, 
it's good to know, but it's...yeah. 
 
Judy’s sense that real circuits 
components behave differently from the 
idealized models could be a healthy skepticism; 
many expert engineers will also hold that view. 
But for experts that skepticism is typically 
balanced with a view that the models are 
productive in generating baseline information 
about how a real system will behave and in the 
design of real circuits. Even when idealized 
models do not represent reality, they can be 
useful in generating solutions to real life 
issues  [76]. But the stance Judy takes is that 
these methods of conceptual reasoning – 
because of their distance from the real world – 
will be completely useless when someone starts 
working on a real circuit.  
Judy uses the language of ideal world, 
physical aspects, and theoretical methods fairly 
interchangeably. Judy’s references to “physical 
aspects” seemed to mirror some of the prompts 
in the revised assignments for the course, where 
students were often asked to present a physical 
(non-mathematical) argument for how a circuit 
will behave. It was sometimes explicitly 
specified that the physical argument is 
conceptual or does not involve carrying out the 
mathematical manipulations of equations. In 
most cases, questions that asked for “physical 
reasoning” were followed by those requiring 
calculations and looking for consistency 
between the conceptual argument and results of 
numerical or symbolic computations.  As the 
interview proceeds, Judy, like other students we 
interviewed, distinguishes between the regular, 
mathematical problems and the more conceptual 
problems on the homework: 
[15:33] Brian: A student whose 
opinion I heard earlier from your class 
had noticed that the homework and 
tests seemed to contain two sort of 
types of questions—two different 
kinds of questions. And I was 
wondering if it’s been your 
experience that you’ve noticed 
something like that. 
[16:01] Judy: Oh. I think, um, 
you mean two parts, right? Umm, I 
think one of them is like, um, just 
problem-solving. Like, you have a 
diagram (spreads hands out, gently 
taps table with fingertips) and then 
you solve for the current or voltage. 
Um, and the other type is like (shakes 
head gently side-to-side) a physical 
question. They will ask you what is 
(shakes head) physically (pinches 
thumb and forefingers of both hands 
together, moving her hands up and 
down) happening in the circuit, and 
you have to explain them in (shakes 
head slightly, left to right) words.  
[16:31] Brian: OK. 
[16:33] Judy: Um, because, 
um, I am also double-majoring. My 
second major is physics, so I guess it's 
good to know more about like, what's 
physically happening (pulls her mouth 
to side) in a circuit. Like for me, cause 
I'm--that's my major. But, if, um--for a 
student who's just doing an EE major, 
I don't think that's very necessary. 
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Just as she distinguishes between real 
world and idealized models, Judy distinguishes 
between course assignment questions focused 
on conceptual reasoning and those focused on 
mathematical manipulations (“problem-
solving”). She ties the conceptual reasoning 
questions with idealized models, and speaks of 
their limited practical use for an engineering 
student (as seen above), while highly valuing 
the role of problem-solving questions (we 
discuss evidence for this later). Her stance 
towards the value of conceptual reasoning is 
nuanced though; she thinks that understanding 
mechanistic models underlying the phenomenon 
(“what’s physically happening in a circuit) is 
valuable for a physics student. So it’s possible 
that the value divide that she sees derives from 
some deeper epistemological discontinuity that 
she sees in physics and engineering. 
Though our attempts to transcribe 
gestures cannot fully capture the annoyance 
Judy displays when discussing the “physical 
question[s],” it was strongly present here and 
elsewhere in the interview. Figure 1 shows a 
snapshot of her expression at time-stamp 16:45, 
right at the moment when she is uttering 
“physically happening” in the transcript above.  
Figure 1 Judy's expression showing negative affect 
when talking about what's "physically happening" in 
the circuit (timestamp 16:45) 
Finishing her last utterance (16:33), Judy 
explicitly labels these questions as “annoying”: 
[17:13] Judy: Yeah. I mean 
those questions are—it’s (shakes head 
gently, but repeatedly) kind of 
annoying (smiles). But it’s good to 
know (rise in voice tone).  
[17:24] Brian: What is it that 
makes them annoying? 
[17:25] Judy: It's hard to 
under--to understand or to answer. 
It's, umm. Yeah maybe we don't 
know enough about physical things. 
Because, in class we don't talk about 
those. We don't--in class we just do 
the problem-solving part. So, um, 
yeah. It's hard to answer. I know 
many people, um go to the professor's 
office hours just asking those physical 
questions. 
[18:10] Brian: Have you talked 
directly with anybody who has a hard 
time also answering the physical kind 
of questions? 
[18:16] Judy: Umm, yeah, but 
we didn't talk much.  
[18:22] Brian: Hmm, OK. 
[18:23] Judy: Uh, yeah. know 
they feel annoying too. 
[18:29] Brian: OK. 
Judy’s annoyance at the conceptual 
questions seems to stem, in part, from the lack 
of instructional support that she perceives for 
answering those questions, especially since she 
also thinks of these questions as difficult to 
answer. And Judy, here, recruits support for her 
annoyance through claiming that this emotion is 
shared by her classmates.  
Physiologically, we again note that 
Judy’s facial expressions reflect mild 
displeasure, though at times, she is also smiling, 
and at times reflecting embarrassment.  The 
substance of her utterances, however, here 
provide greater evidence for her annoyance. 
Here and elsewhere, even when we note 
displeasure, her expressions are muted; and that 
is expected. The interview is not typically a 
context for exaggerated expressions. Judy, 
overall, seems shy during the encounter and 
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speaks in a soft voice. Most importantly, 
emotional expressions are not simple reflection 
of what emotion one experiences, but are also 
tools for communication in social interaction. 
So, given the interview context it is not 
surprising that Judy’s expressions are muted. 
Also, in this particular instance, Judy is 
speaking about her annoyance rather than being 
in a scenario where she is experiencing it. All of 
these caveats bring greater comfort to arguing 
that Judy does feel annoyed at conceptual 
reasoning. 
Following this exchange, Brian turns 
again to explore the relevance of the conceptual 
questions for her projected professional life: 
[18:32] Interviewer: So, um, 
this is a--this is a sort of difficult 
question, but, um, with our imaginary 
person Diana, who's the professional 
engineer. Do you think she would 
probably find that those questions are 
tough also? 
[18:47] Judy: Yes, I guess. 
[18:48] Interviewer: OK. Why 
do you say that? 
[18:50] Judy: Because [shakes 
head gently, but repeatedly, left-to-
right] those physical questions are not 
very related to the actual world; not 
related [knits brow] to her job. 
So...that's why I say it's not very 
necessary for student[s] who are only 
in EE major to learn those parts. 
[19:22] Interviewer: Do you 
think one kind of question is more 
helpful to you than the other kind? 
[19:28] Judy: Umm, yeah I 
think the [cocks head, smiles] 
problem solving is more helpful 
[laughs] and [nods] more important. 
Thus, Judy feels those questions have little 
bearing on what engineers actually do. Judy sees 
conceptual reasoning as useless for practical 
purposes and considers equation-based problem-
solving as “more helpful” and “more 
important.”  
We turn now to another characteristic 
pattern we observed in Judy’s behavior. When 
talking about or engaging in equation-based 
problem solving, Judy displays positive affect: 
she smiles and laughs and does not appear to be 
tensed. Figure 2 shows her general demeanor 
during answering quantitative problems.  
 
Figure 2 Judy shows positive affect when working on 
traditional circuit problems. 
We find no evidence that in these 
moments she is ever thinking about the 
real/ideal gulf. This is striking given that these 
problems refer the same ideal circuits she 
disparages elsewhere in the interview (an 
example problem presented to Judy later in the 
interview is shown in Figure 3). Earlier in the 
interview, though, it was Judy—not Brian—
who brought up the real/ideal gulf when 
discussing conceptual questions. Her 
epistemological view about the real/ideal gulf is 
thus context-dependent: present when she 
discusses conceptual problems, but absent in 
both her discussions of and solutions to 
traditional ones. 
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Over the course of the interview we thus 
noticed repeated affective and epistemological 
reactions from Judy toward aspects of her Basic 
Circuits class. We summarize these as four 
patterns – affective and epistemological – that 
we subsequently use to create cognitive toy 
models for describing the conceptual, 
epistemological, and affective dynamics of 
Judy’s behavior during the interview: 
Pattern 1. Judy was annoyed by the 
conceptual questions on homework  
Pattern 2. Judy viewed conceptual 
reasoning as unproductive to her 
learning 
Pattern 3. Judy expressed a gulf between 
real-world circuits and the ideal circuits 
probed by the conceptual questions 
Pattern 4. When discussing conventional 
quantitative problems, Judy displayed no 
annoyance and did not discuss the 
real/ideal gulf from Pattern #3 
Figure 3 Example problem from the interview: The 
potential at a point a distance   along the "fat 
resistive" wire is given by V = (V0 – ρI). How will 
you explain the equation to a friend from your 
circuits' class. 
 
IV. MODELING JUDY’S REASONING AND 
BEHAVIOR: AFFECT MEDIATED 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 
In this section, we model the patterns in 
Judy’s reasoning in the interview in terms of 
fine-grained cognitive elements. First, we first 
present two possible “toy cognitive 
models”  [38]: one that includes her 
epistemological stances but treats Judy’s 
negative affect toward the conceptual questions 
as epiphenomenal and as such not a part of the 
model; the second includes her affective state in 
the model as coupled with the epistemological 
cognitive elements. Next we trace the 
implications of these two models for 
hypothetical situations in which the two models 
will predict different patterns of 
reasoning/behavior. And we present two 
episodes from the interview that align better 
with the predictions of the affect-inclusive 
model for Judy.   
A. Two “toy” cognitive models for Judy: 
Affect-Free and Affect-Inclusive 
The patterns above are consistent with a “toy 
cognitive model” (Rosenberg et al.) in which 
Judy’s epistemological view about the gulf 
between real and ideal circuits and her sense 
that the conceptual problems are useless 
mutually reinforce one another:  
Real/Ideal Gulf : an 
epistemological stance that 
knowledge relevant to ideal 
circuits and that knowledge 
relevant to real circuits are 
completely disconnected. 
 
Conceptual Reasoning Useless: 
epistemological stance that conceptual 
reasoning is unproductive, but equation-
based problem solving is useful 
The cognitive elements we attribute to 
Judy are context-dependent and dynamically 
activated rather than being global belief-like. 
For Pattern #2 and #3 in the context of thinking 
about the conceptual problems, both the posited 
elements seem to be active; Judy takes the 
stance that ideal circuits are so different from 
real ones as to render pointless thinking about 
ideal circuits. In pattern #4, by contrast, when 
she’s focused on mathematical problem-solving 
the issue of a possible real/ideal gulf isn’t part 
of her thinking, suggesting that the posited 
elements of the epistemological coherence are 
 
R l 
V	  =	  V0	  -­‐	  ρIl 
V0 
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‘off.’ (Being ‘off’ does not imply that she is 
taking an opposing stance; simply that these 
elements don’t seem to be playing a role in her 
reasoning and behavior.) Note that this is a toy 
model, leaving out the vast majority of cognitive 
elements needed to model her cognition; but it 
serves the purpose of explaining the patterns of 
Judy’s epistemological stances. Further, the 
elements that we posit, could also be described 
in terms of finer grained elements (Real/Ideal 
Gulf, for e.g. could be thought of as resulting 
from ontological resources about real world 
versus ideal constructs, an awareness of two 
kinds of knowledge related to the two 
ontologies, and a feeling of strong disconnect 
between the two kinds.) But for our purpose in 
this manuscript, the grain-size we choose 
suffices. 
So far, our model does not include 
Judy’s emotions. One possible way of attending 
to Judy’s annoyance is to think of her affect as 
incidental – Judy is annoyed in the context of 
conceptual questions, and shows positive affect 
in equation-based problem-solving contexts.  By 
this account, affect is a by-product of the 
context but does not stabilize Judy’s 
epistemological stances; as such, it would not be 
an element of her local cognitive coherence.  A 
second possibility is to include an additional 
affective element in the toy model of her local 
cognitive coherence:  
Annoyance: negative affective response 
towards conceptual and qualitative 
reasoning and questions 
Using Judy as an example, we want to 
distinguish between these two models – one in 
which affect is part of the local coherence and 
one in which it isn’t – and argue that in some 
cases, like Judy’s, affect plays a role in driving 
cognitive dynamics and is not just along for the 
ride.  These models can lead to very different 
empirical predictions that can be used to test 
which model has more explanatory power.  For 
example, consider an instance where some 
string of events leads Judy to think conceptually 
in the context of the “physical aspect” problems 
that she dislikes.  The affect-inclusive model 
would predict that if her annoyance is disrupted 
in this instance, then her stance that conceptual 
reasoning is useless would also weaken in this 
instance.  By contrast, the affect-free model 
would not predict any affective influence on the 
epistemological dynamics; disrupting her 
annoyance should not affect her “cold 
cognitive” epistemological stance.  
Here’s another way to distinguish 
between the affect-free and affect-based toy 
models.  Suppose Judy is presented with a real 
circuit set-up (with no idealizing assumptions 
made) and is presented with some conceptual 
reasoning that correctly applies to that circuit. 
According to the affect-free model, the focus on 
a non-idealized circuit should suppress (render 
irrelevant) the stance that real and ideal circuits 
are distinct (Real/Ideal Gulf); and therefore, the 
Conceptual Reasoning Useless stance should be 
weakened as well.  Put more simply, if Judy 
finds idealized conceptual reasoning useless 
partly because she perceives a gulf between 
ideal and real circuits, then focusing on real 
circuits and on conceptual reasoning that 
definitely applies to that real circuit should 
make Judy less prone to see conceptual 
reasoning as useless in this instance.  By 
contrast, our affect-inclusive toy model predicts 
that, even if Real/Ideal Gulf is suppressed, 
Judy’s annoyance at conceptual problems still 
reinforces her Conceptual Reasoning Useless 
stance. Thus, microanalysis of Judy’s local 
epistemological stances in different contexts 
could provide evidence for or against the idea 
that affect plays an integral role in her 
cognitive-epistemological dynamics. 
We scanned the interview for episodes 
that could provide confirmatory or conflicting 
evidence for either model at the expense of the 
other.  We found two such episodes.  They 
provide inconclusive but suggestive evidence in 
support of the affect-inclusive model and 
against the affect-free one.  
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B. Annoyance as part of local cognitive 
coherence: Episode A:  
At the close of the interview, Brian asks 
Judy one of the conceptual homework questions 
from her course. 
[50:06] Brian: Suppose you 
were comparing, um, three different 
types of waves in a circuit. So, you’re 
comparing a sine wave, a square 
wave, and a triangle wave. And all 
three of them have the same RMS 
voltage. Which one has the highest 
peak voltage? 
[50:36] Judy: {sighs, smiles} 
Um, triangle wave. 
[50:39] Brian: OK. How do 
you know? 
Judy talks about how she had found this 
question particularly challenging, forcing her to 
turn to her physics TA for help.  She 
summarizes what she remembered of her TA’s 
explanation, acknowledging that she can’t 
remember it fully, and then turns to an equation. 
She talks about how the answer has something 
to do with the integral, which is “related to” the 
area under the curve. Brian then presses her to 
think it through for herself. In response, she 
does some excellent informal reasoning: 
[52:58] Brian: So, if you didn’t 
have your book, but you know there 
was some relationship between the 
integral and the area. Is there a way 
that you could think through this? 
[53:07] Judy: Um. {6 second 
pause} I guess—I mean I can try. So 
they have the same period like from, 
uh zero to T. So the integral would be 
like from zero to t. Um, and then they 
have some kind of wave form here. 
And they have a same answer. So. {5 
second pause} I dunno. I mean, if 
they have the same area, um and, this 
part is like the same length, um, 
because like. This looks like wider 
{spreads hands apart, past her 
shoulders}—like the area looks wider 
{spreads hands again}. So there 
should be, like. If you squeeze it into 
{presses palms toward each other} 
this form, it should be like, going up 
{forms a peak with her hands}. So, it 
should be like this. So, apparently, 
like, they have a higher peak. 
Judy here is thinking of the area under 
the curve as a kind of squeezable stuff; since the 
area under the three curves is the same, the 
amount of stuff is the same, and when you 
“squeeze” a rectangle (square wave) into a 
triangle (triangle wave) of the same base length, 
the triangle ends up with a “higher peak.” The 
Brian probes her stance towards her qualitative, 
conceptual reasoning: 
[54:42] Brian: But I’m 
interested in that you said 
“squeezing.” Do you ever, um, ever 
um think about the mathematics that 
you use in that way? 
[54:53] Judy:{Judy laughs} No, 
I never think of that before. That’s the 
way how the—my TA told me. Yeah, 
I mean it’s I feel like it’s not very 
formal {smiles}, but it’s very useful.  
Our transcript does not capture the 
satisfaction—evident in the video—she felt 
about her solution. Figure 4 shows a still of here 
facial expressions at this moment.  
Though Judy says of her solution, “it’s 
not very formal”—it’s the kind of qualitative 
reasoning she earlier labeled unproductive—in 
this moment, feeling good about her solution, 
she calls this kind of conceptual reasoning “very 
useful.” The affect-free toy model doesn’t 
predict such a reversal of her epistemological 
stance: if annoyance is not an integral part of 
the local coherence, then it is difficult to 
imagine what would change her view about the 
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uselessness of conceptual reasoning in this 
moment.   
Of course, our argument here assumes 
that Judy would classify this homework 
problem, and her reasoning about it, as the kind 
of “conceptual” question and thinking she 
disparaged earlier in the interview.  She might 
not, because here she does conceptual reasoning 
about mathematical objects and operations 
(integrals, areas under curves) rather than 
conceptual reasoning directly about circuits.  
However, small pieces of evidence suggest 
otherwise.  Judy’s expressions and posture are 
tense as the problem is posed; she acknowledges 
immediately that she had found this question to 
be very difficult, and she approached her 
physics TA, not her Circuits course TA, for 
help; at the end of her successful reasoning, she 
still tries to distance herself from the “informal” 
reasoning.  Though we cannot make a 
conclusive case, this evidence suggests that 
Judy classifies the waveform question and her 
informal reasoning as the kind of conceptual 
question and reasoning she calls useless and 
inapplicable earlier in the interview. 
 
 
Figure 4 Judy's positive affect after solving the 
conceptual problem 
C. Annoyance as part of local cognitive 
coherence: Episode B:  
At one point (minute marked [06.45] above), 
while Judy was still thinking about her 
annoyance at the conceptual problems, Brian 
probed her views about both the real/ideal gulf 
and conceptual reasoning: “So do you think if 
you’re analyzing a real-world circuit, it’s 
important to know about the physical aspects of 
the circuit?” Judy responds, “Not very 
important.”  Crucially, her annoyance at the 
conceptual problems and the associated 
conceptual reasoning are still apparent during 
this part of the interview.  As discussed above, a 
model in which affect is just incidental cannot 
explain Judy’s response: if she finds conceptual 
problems unproductive partly because they 
apply only to an idealized world, then why 
would conceptual reasoning be “not very 
important” when applied to a real-world circuit?   
Of course, an affect-free model different 
from ours might be able to explain Judy’s 
reasoning patterns throughout the interview. But 
given (i) the previous literature showing the role 
of affect on epistemological stances, and (ii) the 
in-your-face nature of the annoyance Judy 
displays towards conceptual problems during 
most of the interview, we have reason to take 
seriously models in which this affective state 
plays a role in stabilizing or destabilizing Judy’s 
epistemological stances. Incorporating an 
affective state (Annoyance) better explains 
Judy’s behaviors and reasoning:  
• Annoyance reinforces Conceptual 
Reasoning Useless and the Real/Ideal Gulf 
(Patterns#2 and #3),  
• When she perceives herself as not engaged 
in conceptual reasoning but problem 
solving, Annoyance disappears and so does 
Real/Ideal Gulf in those moments (even 
though the equations she is using encode 
idealizations) (Pattern #4). 
• Suppressing Annoyance can suppress the 
activation of Conceptual Reasoning Useless 
leading to the reversal of her 
epistemological stance (Episode A), and  
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• Targeting Judy’s epistemology (by focusing 
on real circuits) without addressing Judy’s 
affect fails to suppress Judy’s view that 
conceptual reasoning is “not very important” 
(Episode B).  
V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
At first glance, Judy’s patterns of thought 
(discussed above) seem attributable in part to a 
robust belief that ideal circuits (addressed by 
conceptual problems on the homework) are very 
different from real circuits. We argued, 
however, that this “belief” is not a robust part of 
Judy’s reasoning across all contexts probed in 
the interview. Rather, an affective state—
annoyance— stabilizes and helps to drive her 
views about the course’s conceptual problems 
and her epistemological stance about a real/ideal 
gulf. Including a context-dependent affective 
state (Annoyance) in our model enabled us to 
explain: (i) the minimal or nonexistent role her 
epistemological stance about the Real/Ideal Gulf 
plays in her thinking when she discusses or 
performs mathematical problem-solving, and 
(ii) the disruption of her stance toward 
conceptual reasoning induced by an affectively 
positive experience. In this way, we illustrated 
how including affect in models of cognitive 
dynamics provides additional explanatory 
power. 
This analysis has instructional 
implications. Given Judy’s stated belief that the 
conceptual problems are annoying because of 
the real/ideal gulf, an obvious instructional 
strategy might be to directly address the 
real/ideal gulf by showing how idealizations 
approximate the real world, stressing the near-
agreement of ideal predictions with real results. 
While we do not disagree with that strategy, we 
don’t think it would be enough for students like 
Judy. Bringing about epistemological change for 
Judy (and students like her) might have more to 
do with setting her up to have affectively 
positive experiences, and less to do with 
eliciting, confronting, and replacing her 
problematic epistemological “beliefs.” 
Ultimately, though limited to one student in one 
interview, our analysis illustrates the importance 
and feasibility of incorporating affect into fine-
grained models of cognitive dynamics and how 
doing so can expand the toolbox of productive 
instructional responses.  
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